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ENGAGING THE TAMIL DIASPORA IN PEACE-BUILDING EFFORTS IN SRI
LANKA
Michael Potters
Refugees who have fled the conflict in Sri Lanka have formed large diaspora communities across
the globe, forming one of the largest in Toronto, Canada. Members of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have infiltrated these communities and elicited funding from its members,
through both coercion and consent, to continue the fight in their home country. This paper will
outline the importance of including these diaspora communities in peace-building efforts, and
will propose a three-tier solution to enable these contributions.
On the morning of October 17, 2009, Canadian authorities seized the vessel Ocean Lady off the
coast of British Columbia, Canada. The ship had entered Canadian waters with 76 Tamil
refugees on board, fleeing persecution and violence in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s long and
violent civil war. This was the first group of refugees to arrive in Canada by boat in more than 20
years, but more importantly, it was the first large group of people to arrive in Canada since the
end of the war in Sri Lanka in May 2009.1
Since the beginning of the war in 1983, Canada has accepted thousands of Tamil refugees
from Sri Lanka. From a population of fewer than 2,000 Tamils in 1983, Canada’s Tamil
population has grown to between 110,000 to 200,000 persons,2 90 percent of whom live in
Toronto.3 The arrival of the Ocean Lady was significant. It not only brought attention to the
humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, but also to the significance of Canada’s Tamil diaspora – the
largest in the world – and their role in the affairs of their homeland.4
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and significance of the transnational Tamil
diaspora in relation to the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, with emphasis on the Canadian
diaspora, particularly in Toronto, and support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
First, it will examine the role of the Tamil diaspora in the perpetuation or prevention of conflict
in Sri Lanka. This section will begin with an explanation of the history of the civil war in Sri
Lanka. Second, it will explain the continually evolving role of the diaspora in relation to the
conflict. The paper will conclude with a three-tier prescription for diaspora involvement in
peace-building efforts.
In order to understand the role of the transnational diaspora network in the civil conflict of
Sri Lanka, it is important to understand its history. Sri Lanka is an island state in the Indian
Ocean, south of India. Its population is divided into four ethno-religious groups. The Sinhalese
majority compromise approximately 74 percent of the population and control the government.
They are primarily Theravada Buddhist, speak the Sinhala language, and populate the southern
and central parts of the country.5 Sri Lankan Tamils make up 11 percent of the population. They
are mostly Hindus, and most of them settled in the northern part of the island around the city
Jaffna. The two other groups are the ‘up-country’ Tamils, as well as the Sri Lankan Moors.6 The
conflict, however, is largely between the Sinhalese Majority, and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority.
Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, the Tamils have demanded more power and
better representation in government in order to protect their interests and autonomy from the
Sinhalese majority. The Tamil demand for representational power in government, however, was

5
6

Ibid., 412.
International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”
261

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss3/5

2

Potters: Engaging the Tamil Diaspora in Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lank

not accommodated.7 Eventually, disillusioned by conventional politics, many Tamils began to
argue for the creation of a separate Tamil state called Eelam. A secessionist agenda was born as
an ethnic consciousness and sense of nationalism developed within the Tamil population. In
1975, The LTTE became the guerilla organization at the forefront of the secessionist struggle,
harnessing the frustrations of the Tamil minority and becoming the ‘sole spokesman’ of the
Tamil quest for sovereign statehood.8 As frustrations mounted, violence escalated, and Tamil
youth in particular began to participate in the insurgency movement.9 A civil war erupted in the
northeastern part of the country in 1983, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and
continued until the official military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.
Since 1983, the conflict between the Tamil separatists and Sinhalese government forces in
Sri Lanka has claimed over 65,000 lives and displaced over a million persons.10 The tragic loss
of life cannot be understated. According to scholars however, the displacement and upheaval of
Sri Lanka’s Tamil population, both internally and through migration abroad, is one of the most
significant consequences of the war.11 Formed by several migration waves since independence in
1948, the Tamil diaspora is estimated at one million as of 2010, or approximately one quarter of
the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population.12 Tamils abroad, despite their diversity – including date
of arrival, length of stay, and legal status in their host countries, gender, caste, region, socio-

7

For further discussion and a brief history on the issue of political accommodation for the Tamil
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economic standing and political orientation – usually continue see themselves as belonging to the
diaspora.13
Sarah Wayland, research associate at the Centre for Excellence on Immigration and
Settlement - Toronto, defines the modern diaspora in her piece, “Ethnonational Networks and
Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.” She states, “A diaspora is a type
of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members
permanently reside in one or more ‘host countries,’ and possess a collective, sometimes
idealized, myth of the homeland and will to return.”14 Gabriel Sheffer, Professor of Political
Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, adds more to this definition by describing
fundamental characteristics of the modern diaspora:
They maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived
from their homelands and related to them ... display communal solidarity, which gives
rise to social cohesion ... They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social, political and
economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories within
states ... often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of
significant resources, such as money, manpower, political support, and cultural
influence, with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora. 15
Further, Wayland focuses on and describes the Tamil diaspora in particular. She states,
Diasporas such as the Tamil one exist largely because of ethno-nationalist conflict and
persecution in the homeland. The Tamil diaspora in particular is comprised of refugees
and exiles who are forced to leave their home country because of conflict rather than
because of economic need or the wish to forge a new life abroad. 16
Once accepted into liberal democratic host countries with refugee status, it becomes
possible for the diaspora to express Tamil linguistic, cultural, and religious identity as never
before. Tamils who migrate from a closed society to one that is open capitalize on the country’s
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freedoms to publish, organize, and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was not
possible in their homeland.17 This collective sense of empowerment in combination with a
shared vision of an independent state of Eelam in their home country provides an opportunity
structure whereby social, political, and financial support is mobilized. In the case of the Sri
Lankan Tamils, this was consolidated in the LTTE.
The LTTE claims to represent the political interests of the Tamils. Before its defeat, it
consistently propagated a three-fold message through its political and diplomatic activities in an
effort to condemn the Sri Lankan government and strengthen political support for the
insurgency, both within the diaspora and outside of it.18 Christine Fair, assistant professor at the
Centre for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, explains this three-fold
message propagated by the LTTE,
That Tamils in Sri Lanka are innocent victims of military repression by Sri Lanka’s
security forces and of Sinhalese anti-Tamil discrimination; That the LTTE is the only
legitimate voice of the Tamils and is the only vehicle capable of defending and
promoting Tamil interests in Sri Lanka; There can be no peace until Tamil’s achieve
their own independent state under the LTTE’s leadership.19
It would appear from this message that the Tamil community is united under the banner of
the LTTE. However, this may not be the case. The diaspora community is divided in this respect.
Not every diaspora Tamil donates funds to the LTTE or supports them politically, and countless
Tamils have fallen victim to LTTE violence.20 Throughout the 1980s, the LTTE waged war and
conducted a campaign of assassinations and bombings against rival militants and moderate
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March 25, 2010, doi:10.1080/13537110590927845.
19
Ibid.
20
International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”
18

264
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010

5

Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 5

Tamils in an effort to silence dissent and consolidate support in Sri Lanka.21 This intolerance and
violence forced many Tamils to seek refuge abroad. As a result of their exile, some Tamils feel a
sense of victimization and injustice by the LTTE and do not support them.22 Others support the
LTTE to satisfy feelings of guilt for leaving their homeland behind.23 In this sense, it is very
difficult to determine the true level of diaspora support for the LTTE insurgency.
The fact remains, however, that the diaspora community plays a major role in the conflict
through varying degrees of support for the LTTE. As Fair explains, “The diaspora has been a
fundamental component of the Tamil insurgency and the backbone of the LTTE’s global
operations.”24 Since 1980, the LTTE has established a global network of offices and cells that
spans at least 40 countries and is unrivaled by any other insurgent organization.25 This network,
or what Fair describes as a “global infrastructure,” is based to a great extent on the support and
participation of the diaspora.26
Wayland describes three fundamental activities Tamil elites used to mobilize diaspora
activity, ultimately impacting the conflict in Sri Lanka. These activities were: “information
exchange within the Tamil community via Tamil language newspapers, radio, the Internet and
ethnic organizations; spreading awareness of the Tamil struggle through marches, conferences,
and the lobbying of government officials; and lawful as well as illegal fundraising.27 All three
types of activities, namely Intra-Tamil communication, outreach from the community and
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political lobbying and fundraising, reinforce a proud, independent Tamil identity.28 The impact
of these activities played a crucial role in the civil war in Sri Lanka and may continue to play a
role in the future.
Tamil diaspora networks and communications are a rich and fundamental element of
Tamil identity formation and group cohesion. This is evident in the rise of the Tamil society in
Toronto over the past two decades.29 In 2004, there were ten weekly Tamil language
newspapers, four Tamil language radio stations broadcast seven days a week, three cinemas
showing Tamil language films, and many other outlets of Tamil expression and information
exchange in Toronto.30
The internet has also provided a very important means of communication among Tamils.
Tamil websites provide access to news about Sri Lanka, often analyzing current events with a
Tamil perspective and providing an up-to-date chronology of the conflict in the homeland. The
internet has also been extensively used to establish cyber communities, chat rooms and user
groups.31 These networks and forms of technological communication are crucial to reinforcing
the Tamil ethnonational identity and affiliation with their homeland. Moreover, they are used by
elements of the LTTE to consolidate support for their efforts.32 Through these networks, the
LTTE, or supporters of the LTTE, distribute propaganda and manage the perception of the
conflict in the homeland, further legitimizing their image as protectors of the interests of
Tamils.33

28
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Tamil identity networks are reinforced by political mobilization in the form of
conferences, marches, and various types of advocacy or lobbying.34 This is a major activity of
the diaspora in the host countries.35 The increasing number of refugees and their transition from
refugee claimants to citizens or permanent residents has empowered and enabled the diaspora to
become influential players in the politics of their host countries, capable of bringing attention to
the Tamil issue and impacting policy.
Before being labeled a terrorist organization in 2001 by the United Nations, the LTTE
lobbied host governments through umbrella organizations, openly espousing its secessionist
agenda and ‘three-fold message.’36 In Canada, lobbying was primarily conducted by the
Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils (FACT), an LTTE umbrella organization of ten
Tamil associations with a pro-secessionist stance.37 Since 2001, political participation has
evolved. Supporters of the LTTE in the diaspora now focus on working within the system by
getting Tamils elected to office and using electoral clout and money to influence policy
makers.38 Even those pro-LTTE diaspora initiatives carrying forward the struggle for an
independent state in democratic and transparent ways remain committed to the LTTE’s agenda.39
The LTTE have been very effective at mobilizing the massive Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
This mobilization is described by Fair as the “economic backbone of the militant campaign,” and
is carried out through both coerced and consensual contributions.40 Sometimes this money is

34

Ibid., 420.
R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the PostConflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies (September 2003): 10-12,
www.sangam.org/articles/view2/523.pdf.
36
Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 142-144.
37
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given willingly out of belief that the efforts of the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy
and security for the Sri Lankan Tamils. In other cases, ‘donations’ are collected like a tax by
force, by the threat of force, or through the exploitation of individuals who may be in a given
country illegally and are seeking protection or assistance from the LTTE.41 This ‘tax’ system is
used to ensure a regular flow of income to the LTTE. In Canada, the minimum tax was roughly
$30 per person or family per month depending on the individual’s income,42 and other sources
allege that Tamil businesses abroad are forced to pay Tigers a portion of their earnings.43
Significant funds also come from individual contributions through community temples, cultural
and political events, as well as other activities held in support of the Tamil population.44
It is important to note that Tamils in Canada are not alone in supporting the LTTE from
abroad. Yet, the Canadian connection is very significant. As a police spokesman in the largest
city and commercial capital of Sri Lanka, Colombo, stated, “Canada has been a hotbed of the
Tigers. That is where the biggest contributions come from.”45 In Toronto, in particular, police
claim that LTTE supporters sent as much as $1 million Canadian a month to finance the war in
Sri Lanka.46

41

Ibid., 141.
International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”
43
Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 141.
*This is described by Fair as “proxy lending” by the LTTE. The LTTE puts up an initial
investment in Tamil-run small businesses abroad. The profits made are then split between the
LTTE and the owner. Fair claims that if the figures still remain valid from the mid 1990’s, this
proxy lending in Canada generates roughly $1 million per month.
42
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The Sri Lankan government estimates that the LTTE’s overseas fundraising reached $80
million per year.47 During the conflict, funds raised from abroad were used for destruction and
reconstruction alike. Initially, most of the money was used for sustaining Tamil societies in war
affected areas. However, as the war continued, increasing amounts shifted away from
humanitarian aid towards sustaining the insurgency.48 Despite the military defeat of the LTTE in
May 2009, pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora continue to raise funds in order to carry forward
the struggle.49
The defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has left much of the diaspora in a state of shock and
denial, and has caused a reevaluation of the role that the diaspora plays in the affairs of the
homeland. There is a general acceptance amongst some Tamils across the globe and political
spectrum that the LTTE is a spent military force with little chance of returning.50 Most of the
pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora have acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that militancy has
failed and the struggle for an independent Tamil state should proceed non-violently. However,
the more hardline elements of the diaspora would still prefer the LTTE to be fighting for Tamil
Eelam, choosing militancy over peaceful politics and ignoring its failure.51 Some leaders who
have been considered radical in their politics have been frustrated by what they perceive as a

47

Ibid., 421.
*This figure is disputed by Tamil leaders, claiming it is much less than $80 million. Tamil
leaders claim it is impossible for such a newly formed diaspora to raise such a large sum, a sum
that would require average annual contributions of more than $100 from every Tamil individual
living overseas.
48
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lack of attention being paid to the Tamil situation. These leaders choose unconventional and
sometimes illegal means to convey their message.52
It is clear that as the diaspora struggles with new political realities, and as new strategies
emerge, so too will divergent opinions on a way forward. Yossi Shain, professor of comparative
government and diaspora politics at Georgetown University, explains this in his article entitled
“The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation and Resolution.” He states, “When the conflict
is hot and the homeland is under severe threat, diaspora concerns about the homeland’s
existential survival are paramount, and divergent opinions may be subsumed under a broader
show of support. But when the possibility of peace arises, homeland-diaspora debates and power
struggles emerge.”53 In the case of Sri Lanka, the possibility of peace has arrived. These internal
struggles should be carefully negotiated in order to prevent a return to the violent LTTE agenda.
In the field of conflict resolution, the current stage of this particular conflict might be
referred to as the conflict de-escalation and negotiation stage. This stage is crucial for the
creation and maintenance of peace. As this article has explained, the diaspora have played a
critical role in the conflict through the support of the LTTE insurgency. With the defeat of the
LTTE, there is room to reconstruct a peaceful agreement between the Tamil community and the
Sri Lankan government, with the support of the well-established Tamil diaspora. In order to

52

Ibid.
Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," SAIS Review 22,
no. 2 (July 2002): 135, accessed March 25, 2010,
http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10883142/v22i0002/115_trodicpor.
*Divergent opinions exist within the diaspora community, but also exist between the diaspora
and the Tamil community that remains in Sri Lanka - between homeland and diaspora. There is
considerable difference in the opinions of these two groups, although they may share a common
goal. However, for the purpose of this essay, the difference in opinion between these two groups
will not be discussed in detail. For more information on these differences, see the section
“Divergent Opinions,” in “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE” by the International Crisis
Group.
53
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avoid a reemergence of conflict, all elements of the diaspora community must be considered as
important factors in the negotiation process.
I suggest a three-tier prescription for engaging the Tamil diaspora in peace-building efforts
in Sri Lanka. The first tier of this prescription focuses on the role of host governments. Host
governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to
homeland conflict and engage them. Governments have the necessary task and responsibility of
ensuring public safety and security, as well as promoting peace abroad.

Therefore, it is

important that host governments better understand the nature of all diaspora within their borders,
and their connection to conflict in their homelands. Governments, including the Canadian
government, should acknowledge the possibilities and benefits of engagement of diaspora
communities and incorporate them in policy-making decisions.
The second tier focuses on the relationship between the host government and the diaspora
community. This relationship should be built by encouraging the diaspora community to commit
to peaceful engagement with the Sri Lankan government. Governments may be reluctant to
engage with a non-state group that engages in, or supports, the use of violence. For many host
governments, however, a simple rejection of violence by diaspora groups, although a major first
step in working towards peace, is insufficient for them to completely support diaspora efforts. In
order for the host government to commit to the diaspora, diaspora leaders would not only have to
reject violence, but also reconsider the separatist and illiberal policies of the LTTE, as well as
recognize the damage that the LTTE has done to communities in Sri Lanka and to the Tamil
struggle in general. Consensus within the diaspora in this regard is a goal to work towards. This
major shift in strategy can be facilitated with the help of the host governments.
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The third tier will, in effect, determine the attractiveness of the second tier. It focuses on
the host government and the international community. By encouraging consensus on the need for
non-violence within the diaspora, the host government and the international community can
increase pressure on the Sri Lankan government to address Tamil grievances. This could take the
form of a reconciliation process or institutional reforms at the state and local level. Most
importantly, reforms should be made in Sri Lanka which empower and support minority political
forces and promote a more democratic Tamil community. The Sri Lankan government will also
need to address the longstanding sense of marginalization, disrespect, and insecurity amongst the
Tamil minority which essentially gave rise to the LTTE.
This paper has explained the significance of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in relation to
the conflict in Sri Lanka through support of the LTTE insurgency. It has described, in turn, three
very important activities which diaspora leaders use to consolidate support for the LTTE, namely
intra-Tamil communication, political lobbying and outreach from the community, and
fundraising. Through varying degrees of support and participation in these activities, the
diaspora sustained the LTTE and thus played a role in the perpetuation of conflict in Sri Lanka.
This paper has argued that diaspora communities also have the potential to play a significant role
in peace-building and conflict resolution processes in their homeland.
The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 has created an opening whereby efforts can be
undertaken to utilize the well-established Tamil diaspora for post-conflict peace-building. This
article provides a three-tier prescription as one possible way forward. First, host governments
should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to homeland conflict
and seek to engage them. Second, this relationship can be built by encouraging the diaspora
community to reconsider the violent LTTE separatist agenda and strive for peaceful solutions.
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Third, in order for the latter to be successful, legitimate Tamil grievances must be addressed by
the Sri Lankan government through pressure from the international community.
After decades of civil war in Sri Lanka, the opportunity for peace-building has arrived. As
responsible citizens of Canada, a country which hosts the largest Tamil diaspora in the world,
there is an obligation to move forward proactively, engage with the generally respected
government, and find a suitable, sustainable, and peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict and
Tamil struggle. Members of the Tamil diaspora are members of Canada’s immediate community,
but are also intimately connected to another community in another part of the world. Thus,
Canada plays a unique role in post-conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka, a role that Canada
should embrace carefully, but without hesitation.
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